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Racial and ethnic violence takes many forms. Genocides, ethnic cleansing, pogroms, civil wars, and violent separatist movements are the most obvious 
and extreme expressions, but less organized violence such as rioting, and hate crimes by individuals or small groups are products of racial and ethnic 
conflict as well. Also, the distribution of criminal violence within societies, which may or may not be aimed at members of another group, is in some places 
a by-product of ongoing conflicts between superior and subordinated racial or ethnic groups. Although estimates of the number of deaths attributable to 
ethnic violence vary widely, range of eleven to twenty million given for the period between 1945 and the early 1990s show the gravity of this type of conflict 
(Williams 1994, 50). So it comes as no surprise that scholars have paid increasing attention to such conflicts over the last decades.
Introduction: 
Racial and Ethnic Conflict and Violence
Werner Bergmann, Center for Research on Antisemitism, Technical University, Berlin, Germany 
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1. Major Violent Racial and Ethnic Conflicts
As Donald L. Horowitz stated in his famous Ethnic Groups 
in Conflict, “ethnic conflict is a worldwide phenomenon” 
(1985, 3). The near-universality of multiethnic states and the 
persistence or immigration of strong ethnic or racial groups 
in many modern societies make conflicts along ethnic lines 
quite likely. Racial and ethnic conflicts persist on every 
continent, except Antarctica as far as we know; indeed, such 
conflicts are a central feature of contemporary social life 
and have been for centuries in places where heterogeneous 
populations live, or people from different ethnic or racial 
groups come into contact (Horowitz 2001 includes a global 
overview of ethnic riots). All too frequently these conflicts 
have involved violence. In the Americas—and in Australia—
European colonists and soldiers fought the native popula-
tions from the outset, and these conflicts are central to the 
histories of the three nations of North America, as well as of 
the Caribbean islands. Colonialism is sometimes cited as an 
underlying cause of racial and ethnic violence in Africa and 
Asia, and while this is certainly a credible argument, ethnic 
conflicts existed before European invasions occurred.
Even though the United States has just elected an African 
American president, racial conflict remains an important 
force in social life, and scholars regard persistently high 
rates of violence among the black population as an impor-
tant consequence of racial inequality (Gabbidon and Greene 
2005). Hate crimes and activities of racist movement such 
the Ku Klux Klan and Aryan Nations members are direct 
violent expressions of this conflict. And we should be clear 
that although the most significant conflicts historically have 
been between the white population and blacks and Na-
tive Americans, there are now important other conflicts as 
well: violence has been aimed at people of Latin American 
descent and Muslims, and there have been violent conflicts 
between blacks and some immigrant groups (Koreans, 
Mexicans, and Pacific Islanders).
Canadian social life was disrupted in the late 1960s and early 
1970s by the violent actions of the French Canadian separat-
ists of the Front de libération du Québec (FLQ). Mexico has 
experienced violent uprisings by indigenous populations in 
the southern state of Chiapas, and descendents of the indig-
enous peoples of Central and South America continue to be 
violently subjugated—and continue to fight back.
Historically, Europe, Africa, and Asia have all experienced 
racial and ethnic conflicts, some of which are still capable 
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of flaring into violence today, even as new ones arise. In 
Europe, some former colonial powers have more heteroge-
neous populations today, and at times violent conflict has 
resulted. In Britain we already find anti-immigrant riots 
in the late 1950s (Nottingham and Notting Hill in 1958, 
Middlesbrough in 1961, Dudley in 1962), followed by major 
race riots in the 1980s (Bristol in 1980, Brixton in 1981, Tot-
tenham in 1985) (Panayi 1993). After German reunification 
refugees were attacked in anti-minority riots in eastern 
Germany in the early 1990s, while there were arson at-
tacks on Turkish homes in the western part of the country 
(Karapin 2002). French and Spanish riots in recent years 
have been linked either to disaffection of minority groups 
(e.g. Paris suburbs, 2005), or anti-immigrant sentiment 
(e.g. Madrid, 2007). Alongside ethnic violence directed 
against immigrants, we also still have violent hate crimes 
and sometimes even riots against members of longstanding 
European minorities like the Roma (gypsies) and the Jews 
(European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights 2009; 
ODIHR 2007, 2008; Human Rights First 2008).
Of course racial conflicts have existed for centuries in 
Africa and have been at the heart of many of the continent’s 
violent struggles; ethnic conflicts continue to fuel violence 
in Rwanda, Congo, Nigeria, Somalia, Kenya, Darfur and 
elsewhere. It is argued that many of these conflicts have 
been made more intractable and violent by the way Europe-
an colonialists carved Africa up, drawing borders according 
Europe’s national conflicts and interests, disregarding the 
historic territories of African ethnic and national groupings 
and forcing traditionally hostile groups under a single flag 
(Gurr 1994). Following independence, when colonial domi-
nation ceased to be an issue, these ethnic groups faced the 
question of who the new states should belong to (Horowitz 
1985). Since Nigeria’s independence in 1960 the ethno-
religious groups of the Yoruba, Ibo, and Hausa/Fulani have 
clashed again and again over the division of political power, 
in conflicts ranging from civil war (Biafra) to communal 
riots, in which thousands died. Scholars point out that Bel-
gian government policies in Rwanda gave the Tutsi minor-
ity power over the Hutu majority, which was much resented, 
while the British in Kenya did the same with the Kikuyu 
and other ethnic groups including the Luhya, Luo, Kalenjin, 
and Kamba. These are considerable minorities: the Kikuyu 
are the largest group, but they still constitute less than one 
quarter of the population. These histories contributed to the 
genocide in Rwanda and to Kenya’s post-election violence 
in 2007–8.
Former colonies in Asia have experienced similar ethnic 
problems, especially in India, where the populace has been 
faced with ongoing violent clashes between the Hindu 
majority and the Muslim minority since partition in 1947. 
But there are also conflicts where large modern nations 
have subsumed the historic territory of an ethnic group, 
producing what criminologist Thorsten Sellin (1938) called 
cultural conflict. China has two such ongoing conflicts: Ti-
bet, whose population periodically asserts its independence, 
and more recently in Xinjiang between the Uighur minority 
and the Han majority. These conflicts should be seen in the 
same way as those that occurred in what is now the United 
Kingdom (between the English, Welsh, Scots, and Irish), in 
France with the Bretons, in Spain with the Basques, and in 
the Americas with the indigenous peoples.
These are but a few examples of racial and ethnic conflicts 
that have produced violence in the past, and continue to 
do so. Readers can easily find many more. What we want 
to emphasize is the ubiquity of this phenomena. Racial and 
ethnic conflict is not the exception that sometimes flares 
into violence, but rather a central—and certainly unfortu-
nate—part of social life in many, many countries on all of 
the continents. Which of course leads us to try to develop a 
better understanding of these conflicts and how and when 
they produce violence.
2. Explaining Racial and Ethnic Conflict and Violence
To understand racial and ethnic conflict we have to look to 
history and socio-structural arrangements. The conflicts 
described above must be seen in the context of the historic 
relationships between the groups. Some are based in long-
contested territorial rivalries. The conflict over Tibet is one 
such example: the Chinese insist that it is a historic part of 
their nation, while the Tibetans see themselves as culturally, 
ethnically, and nationally distinct. In the southern Mexican 
state of Oaxaca, indigenous groups want self-determination 
and a degree of independence from the Latino-based na-
tional government. And the violence of Basque separatists 
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is motivated by their belief that their region of the Pyrenees 
should not be controlled by Spaniards.
Colonial histories underlie a number of ongoing racial and 
ethnic conflicts. It is clear that conflicts in the Americas, 
Australia, and in places in Oceania involve native peoples, 
former slaves, and the descendents of colonial settlers. As 
indicated above, the way the organization of the former 
colonies in Africa and Asia ignored the conflicts and 
relationships of the peoples of the colonized areas forms 
the basis of certain contemporary violent clashes. Today, 
a significant portion of the population heterogeneity in 
Western Europe is a consequence of those countries’ histo-
ries of imperial power. Migration from former colonies is a 
significant source of ethnic conflict in the United King-
dom, France, and Spain. And while some would object to 
calling Soviet—and more recently Chinese—adventures in 
Africa colonialism, these activities have resulted in some 
migration from Africa to these places and racist violence 
has resulted.
The dissolution of multiethnic empires commonly gives rise 
to large-scale ethnic conflicts and violence. The disinte-
gration of the Ottoman, Czarist, and Habsburg empires 
resulted in wars (Balkan Wars), genocide (Armenia), ethnic 
cleansing (on the Balkans, population transfer between Tur-
key and Greece), and pogroms (Ladas 1932; Naimark 2001; 
Dunn and Fraser 1996). Here, ethnic sentiment and conflict 
were often fuelled by the doctrine of “national self-determi-
nation.” In more recent history too, the social and political 
changes that followed the collapse of the Soviet Union led 
to some of our current conflicts and the ensuing violence. 
Clashes in the Baltic states between large Russian minorities 
and Latvian, Lithuanian, and Estonian majorities fighting 
for independence in the early 1990s belong to these process-
es of dissolution and separation, as do the armed conflicts 
in the Caucasus (Georgia, Chechnya, Azerbaijan, Dages-
tan, Ossetia, Nagorno-Karabakh, etc). Conflicts between 
the peoples of Yugoslavia that had been suppressed by the 
Communist regime also erupted after the end of the Cold 
War. The creation and expansion of the European Union 
has encouraged more migration within the continent, 
which has increased ethnic heterogeneity and might set the 
stage for violence under certain social conditions.
Socio-structural explanations of racial and ethnic conflict 
are based on conflict theory. If we take the notion that 
social life is characterized by efforts to manage stresses 
between competing interest groups as being fundamental to 
conflict theory, and recognize that racial and ethnic groups 
are virtually always in competition, then heterogeneous 
societies are engaged in a project to minimize conflict and 
violence between segments of their populations. These proj-
ects frequently fail, sometimes spectacularly, other times 
more modestly. The violent clashes described above are 
examples of spectacular failures of efforts to prevent racial 
and ethnic conflicts from turning violent.
Less obviously, racial and ethnic conflicts can produce oth-
er forms of violence too. For example, sociologists explain 
higher rates of violent crime among African Americans as 
resulting from racially based economic relations (Wilson 
1987) and racial residential segregation (Massey and Denton 
1993). Though dated, Sellin (1938) explains how cultural 
conflicts, sometimes along racial and ethnic lines, produce 
criminal violence. Sellin argues that cultural conflicts oc-
cur when migrants bring with them cultural patterns of 
behaviour and norms that are at times inconsistent with 
the laws of the countries they move to. For example, Middle 
Eastern immigrants to the United States have sometimes 
been charged with rape after participating in the mar-
riage traditions of their homelands (older, wealthier men 
consummating arranged marriages with girls under the 
legal age of consent in the United States). Cultural conflict 
also can occur when a territory is invaded by a group that 
proceeds to subjugate the resident population. Language 
conflicts in Western Europe provide examples: the Welsh 
in the UK (which has produced acts of violence) and the 
Bretons in France. Sellin regards border regions as another 
source of ethnic and cultural conflict, as in the case of Spain 
historically with the Moors, and along the U.S./Mexican 
border today.
Horowitz emphasizes that today’s ethnic conflicts possess 
elements of universality and uniformity which they did not 
have before, proposing that certain worldwide ideological 
and institutional currents are responsible for the growth of 
ethnic conflicts: the spread of the norms of equality, which 
makes any subordination illegitimate; the spread of the 
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value of achievement, which stokes inter-group competi-
tion; and the state system, because the control of the state, 
control of a state, and the exclusion of control by others are 
among the main sources of (violent) ethnic conflict (1985, 5). 
Williams, too, stresses the role of the state as a major actor 
in “creating, accentuating, or diminishing ethnic identities.” 
He sees states both as “arenas of rivalry and conflicts” and 
as “resources for ethnic mobilization and counter-mobili-
zation” (1994, 49). At the heart of ethnic conflicts is not an-
cient hatred between ethnic groups—which in many cases 
only formed in the ongoing conflict process and did not 
previously exist as groups with a clearly defined identity; in-
stead, conflicts are driven by political interests. At stake are 
collective goods, including language rights, religious beliefs, 
civic and political rights, economic equality, prestige, and 
political influence (1994, 49, 59).
Fortunately, not all ethnic conflicts become violent. Which 
raises the question under which circumstances conflict-
ing parties resort to violence. The breakdown-deprivation 
approach stresses the importance of grievances, the degree 
of political or economic discrimination, and the restriction 
of political access, with violence emerging as a viable “last 
resort” from a process of conflict (Grant and Wallace 1991; 
Gurr 1993; also Morgan and Nichols 1973). Breakdown theo-
ries of collective action give social breakdown a prominent 
role in the escalation of conflict into a spiral of violence: it 
generates losses that are experienced as highly salient de-
privations, while also undercutting actors’ confidence that 
their accustomed routines will provide a satisfactory future. 
The conjunction of these two factors “gives rise to anger, 
indignation, and revolt” (Useem 1998, 227). The solidarity-
mobilization approach, on the other hand, emphasizes 
political opportunity structures and the mobilization of 
contenders. If groups are excluded from effective participa-
tion in the polity violent collective action may arise (Jenkins 
and Schock 1992; Tilly 2003). These political theories of 
violence see violent action as framed in terms of collec-
tive interest, with actions understood as “purposeful and 
rational” (Rule 1988, 170). Ethnopolitical violence theorists 
view civil violence as part of a continuum of forms of social 
action, as a phase of collective action, which may oscillate 
between violent and non-violent forms (Rule 1998, 170). In 
recent years other scholars have developed a more emotion-
based approach to ethnic conflict and violence, stressing 
emotions like resentment, fear, hatred, and rage (Petersen 
2002; Kaufman 2001). These emotions are associated with 
specific negative action tendencies, e.g. to harm or to wipe 
out somebody. Mobilized emotions are seen as a motivation 
for groups to take collective action (Suny 2004).
For competition theory inter-group hostility and ethnic 
conflict are a natural outcome of competition for scarce 
resources (Giles and Evans 1986; Olzak, 1987). Although 
David Lake and Donald Rothchild see this kind of competi-
tion at the heart of ethnic conflict, too, they do not regard 
competing policy preferences as “sufficient for violence to 
arise” (Lake and Rothchild 1996). Violence is not caused 
directly by inter-group differences, “ancient hatreds,” or 
modern economic stresses, but by “collective fears of the 
future,” which can take many forms: ethnic groups may 
fear for their physical lives and survival, or fear assimila-
tion into a dominant culture. In situations of state weak-
ness (anarchy) the use of violence arises out of strategic 
interactions between groups. Lake and Rothchild see three 
“strategic dilemmas” (1998, 11) that make the use of violence 
between groups more likely: information failure, problems 
of credible commitment arising in situations of changing 
power relations, and incentives to use force pre-emptively in 
situations of state weakness (security dilemma) (1996; 1998, 
9–18).
Andreas Wimmer summarizes recent scholarship on ethnic 
conflicts and formulates some basic insights about their 
character (2004):
Complexity. Conflicts involve more than one single eth-
nic group, interlocking a whole set of political, legal, and 
economic institutions. Different actors—warlords, under-
ground organizations, non-violent actors, etc.—are linked 
in a complex network. In many cases ethnic conflicts do 
not end at the borders of nation-states. Ethnopolitics “is a 
crucial global force” and has to be located in the context of 
international relations (Williams , 50–1; Lake and Rothchild 
1998).
Individuality. Many researchers are now sceptical about the 
possibility of a general theory of ethnic conflict and recom-
mend a case-by-case approach to account for the complex-
ity of the patterns involved. This means accentuating the 
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contextual and historical factors of each case rather than 
applying a “single master scheme.”
Depth. Ethnic conflicts are about “participation and exclu-
sion from state power” (Wimmer 2004, 352), and therefore 
closely related to the basic political institutions. The main 
issues in these conflicts preferentialism, nepotism, and 
clientelism along ethnic lines. Ethnic conflicts are not only 
about political and economic interests (resource distribu-
tion or political power); these interests are intertwined with 
cultural status and identities. Therefore in many ethnic 
conflicts a zero-sum attitude predominates, which makes 
compromise solutions difficult.
Persistence and durability. “Ethnic conflicts are long-term 
phenomena” (Wimmer 2004, 352). In recent years research-
ers have devoted much attention to the self-sustaining 
and self-amplifying logic of violence (Azar 1990). When 
conflicts became violent “war economies,” “markets of 
violence” or a “culture of violence” emerge, creating their 
own dynamics and transforming the interests of the actors 
(Waldmann 2007). For example, warlords are unlikely to 
have much interest in reaching a peace agreement.
Readers will find examples of Wimmer’s insights in the 
three focus contributions in this issue, which examine 
complex, persistent conflicts that result from institutional 
exclusion of groups and illustrate the difficulty involved in 
generating a general theory of racial and ethnic violence.
3. This Focus Issue
The three papers in this focus issue are very different, 
reflecting the broad scope of research into racial and ethnic 
violence. As we have described above, a wide variety of acts 
and underlying causal forces are in play when such violence 
occurs, and the contributions reflect the heterogeneity of 
acts involved: from criminal violence to territorial violence, 
violence as a means of identity politics, and in-group inte-
gration.
The contribution by María B. Veléz, “Banks and the Racial 
Patterning of Homicide: A Study of Chicago Neighbor-
hoods” (2009) is an example of racial and ethnic conflict 
leading to criminal violence. She considers the influence 
of bank mortgage decisions on black, and Latino minority 
neighborhoods and homicide rates, finding that important 
economic decisions—which are external to the communi-
ties—affect rates of this particular crime and the ethnic 
distribution of homicide in Chicago. This paper fits into the 
literature that documents how racial residential segregation 
in cities concentrates the negative impact of social problems 
(Massey and Denton 1993), and violent crime (Peterson 
and Krivo 2005) onto the economically and socially most 
marginal segments of populations. Of course, bankers do 
not realize that their decisions contribute to racial or ethnic 
violence, but to the extent that they are a determining force 
in higher levels of homicide in black and Latino neigh-
bourhoods, as Veléz demonstrates, they in fact are. It is a 
challenge for scholars to explore and document how other 
public and corporate decisions raise or lower the likelihood 
of racial and ethnic conflict and violence.
Challenging interpretations of communal violence be-
tween Hindus and Muslims in India as a defensive rejec-
tion against Western ideas or the threats of globalization 
and modernity, Julia Eckert’s contribution on “The Social 
Dynamics of Communal Violence in India” (2009) focuses 
on “the social dynamics that evolve in relation to conflicts 
within a group.” She sees the construction of hostility be-
tween Hindus and Muslims as a part of the identity politics 
of the Hindu nationalist project, aiming at “unifying the 
Hindu population and defining the nation against the 
republican idea.” In this view the Muslims play the role of a 
substitute enemy, because violence, which operates via “in-
stitutionalized riot systems,” as Paul Brass calls them, serves 
as a tool to affirm local networks and create experiences of 
participation and empowerment among the members of 
the nationalist movement. The ability of collective violence 
to draw clear boundaries between “us” and “them” is used 
to overcome internal differences and unify the Hindu 
population under the banner of Hindu nationalism. Eckert 
shows that communal violence is at the same time a mass 
movement and clearly manipulated by Hindu nationalist 
organizations.
Jonah Leff’s “Pastoralists at War: Violence and Security in 
the Kenya-Sudan-Uganda Border Region” (2009) is obvi-
ously about violence, but it is not, at least on the surface, 
about racial or ethnic violence. The focus is on conflict 
between groups of pastoralists over access to scarce water 
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and grazing lands, and the way the increasing availability 
and lethality of guns in the region has made clashes—which 
have occurred for centuries—much more deadly. It is about 
ethnicity, nonetheless. The clashing groups are defined by 
their ethnic affiliation to tribes that have longstanding, con-
flicting claims to these resources. Recent wars have made 
small, portable arms more widely available. and worsened 
violent ethnic conflicts over resources that will, for the 
foreseeable future, remain scarce, causing problems for the 
participants as well as those charged with maintaining local 
security. Here, war, as a factor external to the competing 
ethnic groups, has exacerbated longstanding ethnic group 
conflicts and made them more lethal.
These three contributions highlight the importance of 
exclusion as a major social force underlying racial and 
ethnic conflicts. Exclusion can come from many sources: 
economic institutions or systems, political arrangements, 
or resources; each made more problematic by historical 
patterns of winners and losers. These contributions remind 
us of the futility of “blaming” racial and ethnic conflicts on 
explanations based on the particular cultures of the groups 
involved. In these instances, broader institutional forces, 
not group norms or values, are important.
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